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Resilient Operation of Heterogeneous Sources in
Cooperative DC Microgrids
Subham Sahoo, Member, IEEE, Tomislav Dragičević, Senior Member, IEEE and Frede Blaabjerg, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—As distributed control layer makes DC microgrids
vulnerable towards cyber attacks, the identification and mitiga-
tion of attacked agent(s) becomes even more challenging with
heterogeneity between each source based on factors, such
as capacity, reliability and generation cost. This letter proposes
a novel resilient methodology, which involves detection using
adaptive discord element (ADE) and immediate mitigation via
an event-driven approach. The proposed approach successfully
mitigates cyber attacks under experimental conditions.
Index Terms—DC microgrid, cyber attacks, cooperative con-
trol, heterogeneous sources, resilient controller.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ISTRIBUTED energy management system (EMS) in DCmicrogrids offers a flexible and economic alternative to
centralized approach [1]. It provides resiliency from single-
point-of-failure, plug-and-play capability, and a reduced cost
of communication infrastructure [2]. As shown in Fig. 1,
the measurements from grid-forming converters (commonly
termed as agents in this letter) are transmitted between each
other to achieve consensus by accommodating average voltage
regulation and power sharing, respectively. The intermittent
nature of renewable energy sources, which are usually operated
in grid-following mode to extract maximum power, bring
asymmetry in the current sharing profiles of grid-forming
converters. Moreover, different characteristics of each source
and operation principle of the corresponding converters leads
to the principle of heterogeneity in DC microgrids.
Based on some of the prominent aspects of heterogeneity
overviewed in Table I for DC microgrids [1], [3]-[4], energy
management schemes often introduce an adaptive droop to
be applied on local current measurements, which leads to
disproportionate current sharing profile.
However, these measurements can be corrupted by inject-
ing malicious data into the cyber-physical components of
the microgrid [6]. Many attack detection models have been
proposed to detect such attacks for proportionate current
sharing [7]-[10]. However, detection of these attacks becomes
more challenging with disproprtionate current sharing profile.
On the other hand, mitigation of these attacks is still not
adequately discussed in the abovementioned papers. To the
best of authors’ knowledge, the only notable contribution in
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Fig. 1. Generic cyber-physical model of DC microgrid with N grid-forming
heterogeneous agents: Blue and green arrows represent the cyber link and
measurements/control signals, respectively. Further, red bolts represent the
attacked layers.
this area is the trust and confidence factor based resilient
control in cooperative DC microgrids [11]. However, the
online calculation of these factors, which involves additional
layers of integration and division operations, assigns high
computational burden. Moreover to provide attack-resilient
operation, it requires a minimum of half of the neighboring
converters to be trustworthy, thereby limiting its resilience
capability for worst-case attacks.
TABLE I
ASPECTS OF HETEROGENEITY IN DC MICROGRIDS
Heterogeneity Design of adaptive droop ∆Ri
Capacity oriented [1] H2(s)[exp(
∑
jεNi
(SoCj(t) − SoCi(t))) − 1]1
Reliability oriented [3] D
i
maxk{Dk}
2
Cost oriented [4]-[5] H3(s)[
∑
jεNi
(λj(t) − λi(t))]2
1 H2(s) is a PI controller, SoCj & SoCi are the state of charge of batteries
in ith and jth agent, Ni is the set of neighbors of ith agent.
2 Di and Dk denotes the total damage and component damage (for each
component k) in ith converter, respectively.
3 H3(s) is a PI controller, λj & λi are the incremental costs of generation
of ith and jth agent, respectively.
To remove the attack elements in cooperative DC mi-
crogrids, this letter proposes an adaptive discordant element
(ADE) for each agent. Extending the presence of attacks as
a binary mechanism using ADE, an event-driven mitigation
strategy is proposed to reconstruct and replace the attacked
signal with a trustworthy signal. As opposed to [11], this
strategy can provide resilience even using a single trustworthy
neighboring information. The proposed resilient strategy is
tested for the attacks discussed in [9] to validate its robustness
in a distributed DC microgrid.
II. DESIGN OF RESILIENT CONTROL STRATEGY
In the system shown in Fig. 1 comprising of N agents, each
communication digraph is represented via edges to constitute
an adjacency matrix A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N , where the
communication weights are given by: aij > 0, if (ψi, ψj) ε E,
where E is an edge connecting two nodes, with ψi and ψj
being the local and neighboring node respectively. Otherwise,
aij = 0. Further, the incoming cyber information matrix can be
denoted by Zin =
∑
i∈N aij . Hence, if A and Zin match each
other, the Laplacian matrix L is balanced, where L = Zin−A.
Using the preliminaries of the communication graph, the
local control input of the cooperative secondary controller can
be written as:
ui(t) = ξ
∑
jεMi
aij(xj(t)− xi(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ei(t)
(1)
where ui = {uVi , uIi }, ei = {eVi , eIi } corresponding to the
elements in xj = {V̄j , RjIj}, ξ is the convergence variable
and Mi is the set of neighbors of ith agent. Further, V̄j , Rj
and Ij denote the average voltage estimate, dynamic droop
and output current of the neighboring agents, respectively. The
design of dynamic droop for ith agent is carried out using:
Ri = R
o
i + ∆Ri (2)
where, Roi = ∆Vi/I
max
i is a fixed droop quantity with ∆Vi
denoting an allowable voltage deviation of 5% and Imaxi
denoting the maximum output current for ith converter. On
the other hand, the adaptive droop for ith agent, ∆Ri can
be designed based on the aspect of heterogeneity, as
explained in Table I. It is worth notifying that the update for
capacity and reliability oriented adaptive droop gain is carried
out in shorter (in ms) and fairly longer (monthly) time-scale,
respectively.
Using (1), the control inputs to achieve average voltage
regulation and proportionate current sharing can be obtained
from secondary sublayer I and II respectively by using the
following voltage correction terms for ith agent:
Sublayer I: ∆V1i = H1(s)(Vref − V̄i) (3)
Sublayer II: ∆V2i = H2(s)uIi (4)
where V̄i = Vi +
∫ τ
0
∑
i∈Mi(u
V
i dτ), while H1(s), H2(s) are
PI controllers. Further, Vref is the global reference voltage
quantity for all the agents. The correction terms obtained in
(3)-(4) are finally added to the global reference voltage to
achieve local voltage references for ith agent using:
V iref = Vref + ∆V1i + ∆V2i . (5)
Using (5) as the local voltage reference for ith agent,
the control objectives for distributed EMSs [1]-[2] in DC
microgrids are achieved, which can be summarized as:
lim
t→∞
V̄i(t) = Vref , lim
t→∞
uIi (t) = 0 ∀i ∈ N (6)
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Fig. 2. Proposed resilient strategy in ith agent to mitigate deception attacks
in DC microgrid with heterogeneous sources–red bolts depict cyber attack.
However, the objectives in (6) can be misconstrued in the
presence of cyber attacks on current measurements in ith agent
using:
Sensor attack: Ifi = Ii(t) + κI
a
i (7)
Cyber link attack: Ifj = Ij(t) + κI
a
i (8)
where κ = 1 denotes the presence of an attack element Iai in i
th
agent, or 0 otherwise. Hence, this letter concerns the mitigation
of the most sophisticated attack, namely deception attacks,
where İ
a
= LIa = 0. Since the attack elements in deception
attacks follow the cooperative synchronization theory, it leads
to a feasible and stable solution. Further details about these
attacks and their impact in DC microgrids with homogeneous
sources can be found in [9].
To detect the presence of attack elements, we consider the
average state-space voltage dynamics of each grid-forming
DC/DC converter in vector form upon multiplication of R
on both sides, given by:
RV̇ = RC−1(ThIin − If ) (9)
where Th = 1− T. Further, Iin, T, R, C and If denote the
diagonal matrices of the input current Iini , duty ratio Ti,
dynamic droop Ri, DC link capacitance Ci and the attacked
output current measurement Ifi respectively, for N agents.
Considering the error into the voltage controller to be zero
under steady-state conditions such that
lim
t→∞
Vi(t) = V
i
ref . (10)
Substituting (5) into (10) and multiplying LT on both sides,
we get steady-state solution of reference tracking as:
LT∆V1 + LTH2eIa + Vref1 = LTV (11)
where eIa denotes a diagonal matrix of the error quantity
eIij in (1) including the attacked signal I
f
i (t) (κ = 1), ∆V1
denotes the diagonal matrix of ∆V1i in (3) with H2 denoted
as diagonal matrix of PI controller in (4). Moreover, 1 denote
an identity matrix with a dimension of NxN .
Remark I: Since this letter only considers cyber attacks on
current measurements, leaving the average voltage estimates
uncompromised, LT∆V1 = 0 holds true [7].
Using Remark I to eliminate LT∆V1 in (11) and differen-
tiating (11) w.r.t. time upon multiplication of R on both sides,
we get:
LTRKH2P ė
Ia + LTRKH2I e
Ia − LTRV̇ = 0. (12)
As already explained in [9], LT eIa = 0 and LTC−1If = 0
will hold true for deception attacks. Using these equalities after
substituting (9) in (12), we obtain:
LTRKH2P ė
Ia − LTRC−1ThIin = 0. (13)
Remark II: Due to the injected attack signal, the first term
of (13) will be asymmetric, not obeying the consensus theory.
For (13) to hold true, this property will be reflected in the
second term of (13), which becomes the basis of detection
for deception attacks in cooperative DC microgrids with
heterogeneous sources.
Since the proposed detection concept for heterogeneous
sources (operating with an adaptive droop ∆Ri) is basically
inspired from [8] -[9], it is termed as adaptive discordant ele-
ment (ADE) in this letter, can be mathematically represented
for ith agent using Remark II as:
ADEi = li[
∑
jεMi
aij(RjI
in
j −RiIini )][
∑
jεMi
aij(RjI
in
j +RiI
in
i )] (14)
It is worth notifying that the proposed detection criteria is
Fig. 3. Performance of ADE for various cyber attacks at t = [1, 2] s and
the fault detection metric FDI [8] for current sesnor fault at t = [2, 3] s.
scalable to N agents, which has been largely discussed in
[8]-[9]. Since ADE exceeds β only in the presence of cyber
attacks on current measurements, it guarantees robust and ac-
curate detection performance under many scenarios including
sensor and line-to-line faults, which has been detailed in Table
II. Some of the scenarios in Table II have been simulated for
ADE in Fig. 3, where ADE2 goes beyond β(= 0.02) only for
cyber attacks on agent II irrespective of their nature. On the
other hand, ADE2 stays within the detection band β for load
change and sensor faults. In fact, sensor faults are detected
via a fault detection metric FD2I exceed ρFDi (= 0.02) [8],
thereby differentiating sensor faults with deception attack.
Even though discord element based detection strategy was
proposed in [9], a timely mitigation technique to remove these
TABLE II
APPLICABILITY OF ADE UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
Scenarios ADEi Remarks
Load change/line outage ≤ β Realized in [8]-[9]
Attack under communication delay > β Realized in [8]-[9]
Ramp/sinusoidal attack > β Realized in [9]
Current sensor fault ≤ β FDiI > ρFDi
1[8]
Converter outage under attack > β Realized in [8]-[9]
Line-to-line fault – Fault evaluation2[9]
1 A fault detection metric FDiI is proposed in [8] to differentiate
between a current sensor fault and a cyber attack.
2 A line-to-line fault evaluation theory is proposed in [9] to differentiate
between line faults and cyber attacks.
attacks was still not discussed. As the robustness of the
proposed attack detection strategy is guaranteed using Table
II, this letter uses an event-driven signal reconstruction based
mitigation strategy based on a follow-up signal from ADEi to
provide resilience against such attacks. Upon detection of the
presence of attack element in ith agent using (14), an authen-
tication label Ωi is generated for the current measurements
in ith agent to alarm the presence of attack element to its
neighbors. It should be noted that the nature of authentication
label is binary, such that:
Ωi =
{
0(F), if ADEi > β
1(T), else
(15)
where β is a small value detection threshold to disregard
measurement noise yet ensure accurate detection. To simplify
the representation of authentication for any signal, ◦T and
◦F will be used to symbolize True and False for the
communicated measurements, respectively using (15).
As long as (15) holds True, the control variables used in
designing ADEi are forced to follow the trajectories of non-
compromised neighboring signals (with Ωj labeled as True).
As highlighted in Fig. 2, if the set of authentication signals
Θi for ith agent is not a zero vector in the presence of
attack elements, event-driven resilient signals are reconstructed
to mitigate deception attacks in system with heterogeneous
sources using:
Ii(tk) = Ξ1[
RjI
T
j (t)
Ri
] (16)
where ◦(tk) (with k as the triggering instant) denote the event-
triggered samples of the output current in ith agent. It is worth
notifying that Ξ[◦] in (16) is a triggering function, which
holds the input signal ◦ until the next instant of triggering.
These event-driven signals are generated when the triggering
criterion (LRIin > β) in Fig. 2 is activated in the attacked
agent. However, if Θi is a null vector, this implies that all the
remaining agents are compromised with attack elements and
should be prevented from being used in ith agent. Hence, this
leads to localized operation of ith agent (as shown in Fig. 2).
The resilient action is completed by susbstituting the event-
driven resilient signals with the attacked signal based on the
local authentication signal using:
Ii(t) = ΩiI
f
i (t) + (1− Ωi)Ii(tk) (17)
Finally, the signal obtained in (17) is substituted into (1) to
realize the mitigation of MITM attacks in DC microgrids.
As soon as the reconstructed signal in (17) obeys (6), the
authentication label transmitted to the neighbors is switched
back to T. The proposed strategy not only mitigates the attacks
but allows to operate normally under external disturbances
such as load change, communication delay, etc.
1se
L
Source I
1C 1V
1I 1r
2V
2I 2seL
2C
2r
Source II
Load
Distributed 
Control
Resilient 
controllerMicroLabBox 
DS1202
DC Programmable 
Load
Level 
Shifter
Buck 
Converters LEM 
Sensor 
Box
MicroLabBox 
DS1202
P
C
DC 
Power 
Supply
Oscilloscope
Tie-line 
Resistances
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. (a) Experimental setup of a cooperative DC microgrid comprising of
N = 2 agents controlled by dSPACE MicroLabBox DS1202 supplying power
to a programmable load, and (b) single line diagram of the experimental setup.
Deception 
Attack 
Vdc1 (50 V/div)
Vdc2 (50 V/div)
Idc1 (5 A/div)
Idc2 (5 A/div)
β = 0.02
β = 0.04 β = 0.05
Deception 
Attack 
2
1
2
1
(a)
(b)
Increase 
in load
Increase 
in load
Vdc1 (50 V/div)
Vdc2 (50 V/div)
Idc1 (5 A/div)
Idc2 (5 A/div)
Fig. 5. Performance of DC microgrid (shown in Fig. 4(b)) for a deception
attack on agent II: (a) in the absence, and (b) in the presence of the proposed
resilient strategy.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed detection strategy has been experimentally
validated in a DC microgrid operating at a voltage reference
Vref of 64 V with N = 2 heterogeneous sources, as shown in
Fig. 4(a). The entire physical layer alongwith flow of control
signals is detailed in Fig. 4(b). Both the sources have been
made to regulate the average voltage and share load current to
regard the reliability of converters for enhancing the lifetime of
components. Using the local and neighboring measurements,
the proposed resilient strategy shown in Fig. 2 is modeled for
every converter to mitigate the attacks and meet the control
objectives in (6). The experimental testbed parameters along
with the adaptive droop gains are provided in Appendix.
In Fig. 5(a), before the deception attack is launched on agent
II, agent II shares the load current in higher proportion as
compared to agent I. This sharing proportion can be explained
by severe ageing of component(s) in source I. When the attack
is launched on agent II, it can be seen that the currents are
being shared almost equally in the absence of the proposed
resilient controller. As a result, reliability-oriented sharing
between DC sources is clearly disregarded due to the attack.
However, in the presence of the proposed resilient controller,
ADE2 is immediately activated when the deception attack is
launched and adjusts the authentication label of signals from
agent II to F. As per the proposed resilience mechanism, IT1 is
immediately transmitted to reconstruct I2(t) as per (16). This
action allows the system to return back to the normal operating
condition (pre-attack loading level). Additionally, it can be
seen in Fig. 5(b) that the dynamic performance varies for
different values of the threshold β. Intuitively, the settling time
increases as the value of β increases from 0.02 to 0.05. This
adjudges β to be as small as possible for faster settling time,
yet it has to be sufficiently larger than the measurement noise
to avoid unnecessary triggering. Moreover, it can be clearly
justified that the resilient mechanism performs satisfactorily
for steady-state conditions as well as disturbances, such as
load change. The action is so fast that it easily accomodates
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Fig. 6. Performance of DC microgrid (shown in Fig. 4(b)) for deception
attacks on agent I and II simultaneously: (a) in the absence, and (b) in the
presence of the proposed resilient strategy.
an increase in load immediately following the deception attack.
Finally in Fig. 6(a), when a worst-case deception attack
is launched on both agents, the current sharing proportion
between the converters is reversed in the absence of re-
silient controller, which disregards the aspect of reliability
of components in power electronic converters. This issue has
been addressed by the proposed resilient controller in Fig.
6(b) where the sharing proprotion between the converters
is retained as per the pre-attack loading levels to regard
reliability. Since the authentication pool Θi is F for both
agents, the signal reconstruction algorithm holds the pre-attack
instant throughout the period. It is worth notifying that any
load change under these circumstances will lead to local
operation (disabled secondary controller, as shown in Fig.
2). Nevertheless when the attack element is removed from
agent I, it can be seen that the system returns back to the
normal operating condition following a transient using the
authenticated IT1(t). Hence, this validates the effectiveness of
the performance of proposed resilient controller to a maximum
of (N−1) scale attacks (at least one trusted agent will always
be required in the system to broadcast True signals). This
establishes that the proposed resilient mechanism can be easily
scaled to many applications in DC based power electronic
systems.
IV. CONCLUSION
A novel resilient control strategy is proposed to mitigate the
most sophisticated form of cyber attacks in DC microgrids.
As opposed to the existing work, this strategy is simple and
can be readily applied to any distributed energy management
schemes (EMSs) for DC microgrids comprising of heteroge-
neous sources. Additionally, this strategy can be easily scaled
up to any number of units since only one trusted agent is
required to reconstruct trustworthy signals, thereby removing
the attack. This theory has been validated experimentally to
show the robustness and ease of implementation for mission-
critical applications such as naval ships and electric aircrafts,
where reliability and security are of prime concern.
APPENDIX - EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
The considered system consists of two sources with the
converters rated equally for 600 W. It should be noted that
the controller gains are consistent for each converter.
Plant: Lsei= 3 mH, Ci= 100 µF, r1 = 0.8 Ω, r2 = 1.4 Ω
Controller: Vref= 64 V, KH1P = 1.92, K
H1
I = 15, K
H2
P = 4.5,
KH2I = 0.08, l = 1.36, ξ = 1.8, β = 0.02, R
o = 0.5, ∆R1 =
0.05, ∆R2 = 0.4.
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